By Erik Meijer - Amidst the ongoing economic crisis the British government has issued a Green Paper on the future of the British armed forces, intended to set out the questions to be posed for the Strategic Defence Review (‘SDR’) later this year. It will most certainly take a very critical look at several high profile and expensive acquisition programs among which are the UK’s planned two new aircraft carriers, high tech and high-priced air defence destroyers and the replacement of Britain’s nuclear deterrent, currently vested in nuclear ballistic missile submarines. With the upcoming SDR, all options are on the table as the other two branches of Britain’s armed forces are vying for precious space in the defence budget. This article focuses on the potential consequences for British naval power by looking at Britain’s role in future maritime conflict.

The 2010 Strategic Defence Review
On February 3rd last, the British Ministry of Defence (‘MoD’) published its Defence Green Paper entitled Adaptability and Partnership: issues for the Strategic Defence Review (‘Green Paper’). In it, the MoD invites views on the future of British defence policy to be submitted in preparation for this year’s Strategic Defence Review, which will decide the future shape and role of the British Armed Forces. Last December, the British National Audit Office published a scathing report on the MoD’s major projects. According to Amyas Morse, head of the National Audit Office, "The Ministry of Defence has a multi-billion pound budgetary black hole which it is trying to fix with a 'save now, pay later' approach. This gives a misleadingly negative picture of how well some major projects in MoD are managed, represents poor value for money and heightens the risk that the equipment our Armed Forces require will not be available when it is needed or in the quantities promised. Bold action will be required to prioritise defence spending as part of the planned Strategic Defence Review after the General Election". The MoD’s method of balancing the budget has slowed certain projects such as the Royal Navy’s planned two new Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers. But this will result in the ships being delivered one or two years later than planned, and at a considerable higher cost as well: saving now in the end will cost the British taxpayer £1,124 million in costs in subsequent years. More ominously, however, were reports that in order to close its budgetary gaps the MoD has plans to either not equip one of the two aircraft carriers with aircraft or even to sell it off altogether to India. This would leave the UK with just one operational carrier capable of any meaningful power projection. In the current information age, it is not unthinkable that future adversaries would plan any major operation when this carrier is undergoing repairs.

The UK’s nuclear deterrent
Beside the potential impacts on the Royal Navy’s power projection capabilities, another mainstay of Britain’s defence policy will come under threat in the SDR. Currently, four nuclear ballistic missile submarines of the Vanguard-class, each armed with sixteen Trident nuclear missiles, constitute the UK’s sole nuclear deterrent. Four submarines ensure that the UK can permanently maintain at least one at sea at all time thus ensuring a credible nuclear deterrent. The Vanguards entered service in the mid-1990s and will be due for replacement sometime around 2020. However, work on these replacements needs to commence soon for them to be available in time to start taking the place of the Vanguards as the latter approach the end of their service life. Given the enormous investments needed to develop a new submarine based missile system (estimated to cost something in the range of £20 billion ) it begs the question what role nuclear weapons have for the UK in the future. At present, the role of the Vanguards is firmly anchored in the British government’s determination to hold on to a credible nuclear capability amidst a world of uncertainty and threats from states like North Korea and Iran. Furthermore, having a nuclear capability adds a certain authority to Britain’s claim to a seat at the big table as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. At the same time however, the UK is also committed to the Global Zero, the campaign to rid the world of nuclear weapons. Indeed, it remains one of the enigmas in modern times: even though the utility of nuclear weapons is widely believed to be very low, some states will stop at nothing to acquire them to satisfy a false sense of security and provide a certain ‘major power’ status.

The Future of War
The SDR must not only be about finding money by slashing expensive projects, but also about tailoring British naval power to the threats of the future. This raises the question what naval warfare in the future will look like.

Proponents of Sea Power point to a number of factors as to why the sea is so important to us. First of all, the global economy has become increasingly interconnected over the past decades. Global seaborne trade has multiplied by four over the last forty years. Ninety percent of world trade and two thirds of the global flow of oil is carried by water. In other words, freedom of the seas is vital for the economy in a globalizing world.

Maritime threats to this process of globalisation include the disruption of sea based shipping. Current practice in the industry depends on ‘just enough, just in time’ making any interference in the system a very serious affair. To counter these threats navies must plan to develop suitable platforms and weapons systems capable of a whole range of missions. Geoffrey Till distinguishes between modern and postmodern navies. The postmodern navy is influenced by the process of globalisation and the need to protect the international trading system. It focuses on sea control, expeditionary operations, good order at sea and the maintenance of a maritime consensus. Sea control involves a classic mission of a navy: to use the seas for whatever purpose by that power that controls it. Expeditionary operations of the postmodern navy are aimed at dealing with the causes of (maritime) disorder at shore. Finally, providing for good order at sea concerns the regulation and protection of shipping. The postmodern navy is characterised by a specialised contributory fleet: accepting that because of limited (financial) resources, no single nation can afford to maintain the full range of naval assets to perform its missions. Rather, the realisation is that a cooperative strategy is needed with the resultant loss of political and military freedom to act.

In contrast, the modern navy is the product of industrial war and based on notions of protecting national security interests rather than acknowledging as the postmodern navy does, that there is a need to work together with other maritime forces. Its missions involve the classic attributes of sea power: nuclear deterrence and ballistic missile defence, sea control, narrow concepts of maritime power projection, good order at sea and maritime consensus. For a modern navy, sea control is more about peer competition, power projection by amphibious and naval strike missions, and it will look at protecting the national interest when it comes to good order at sea and maritime consensus. Hence, a modern navy consists of a balanced fleet able to perform this range of tasks.

It must be added however that the division between a modern and postmodern navy is by no means black and white, and often a mix of the two can be found in many navies. Till emphasises the need for navies to invest in constabulary and stabilisation capabilities to counter the threats of tomorrow. The question will thus be how navies will strike the balance between a modern and a postmodern posture.

The US Navy’s ‘Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower’
When looking for guidance on the answer to this question, one can draw some useful conclusions from the doctrine of the world’s most powerful naval power, the US Navy. The US Navy recently published its new maritime strategy in a document called the ‘Cooperative Strategy for 21st Seapower’. This article will not discuss this document in depth but will highlight some elements of interest for the potential future course of the Royal Navy. Despite their overwhelming preponderance in firepower and cutting edge technology, the US Navy has become increasingly aware that with increased sophistication of weapons systems, the price tag has gone up. The US Navy has recognized that it simply cannot afford the amount of ships needed to be everywhere, all of the time. Hence, the need arises to cooperate with other navies, both within the NATO alliance or in other multilateral coalitions. For this purpose, the US has launched the Global Maritime Partnership programme. The Cooperative Strategy document also makes very clear that a shift in threat has taken place. The emphasis on high intensity interstate warfare has been replaced by an emphasis on more asymmetric, non-state threats. This would require a more constabulary role for navies. Still, the importance of expeditionary capabilities and escalation dominance is acknowledged and it is hard to see the US Navy giving up on these in the foreseeable future.

Where does this leave Britain’s naval power? In a report called ‘The Future Character of Conflict’, the MoD appreciates that ‘qualitative advantage may no longer be assumed in the future’. In future conflict the technological edge may also wither, meaning that less advanced states or other actors will more easily have access to modern technology. According to the report, these adversaries will present the UK with hybrid threats (i.e. a mix of conventional, irregular and high-end asymmetric threats). To counter these threats the report recommends that the UK adopt responses that are currently foreign to the UK armed forces. In addition, the need for investment in joint operations capabilities and partnerships allowing the UK ‘to punch above its weight’ to counter the threats of tomorrow is stressed. But the key point of the report is, that given the fact that technological superiority can no longer be guaranteed, the UK should invest in ‘high calibre people, educated and trained to a new benchmark’. What this means for the fate of the Royal Navy’s shipbuilding programmes remains unclear. However, judging from the emphasis on naval assets being able to deliver broad utility, the answer to the question of investing in nuclear ballistic missile submarines or in aircraft carriers, might present itself. Also, platforms able to combat low-end threats, such as patrol boats or mine sweeping vessels, may offer more utility than nuclear ballistic missile submarines.

Conclusion
In conducting its SDR, the UK must take as its starting point the recognition that no national naval force will be able to provide security over the entire maritime domain. It must also appreciate that other threats than interstate warfare have emerged that might require different naval assets to deal with. Finally, the UK must ask itself whether maintaining a nuclear deterrent still serves a vital national interest, given the lack of a clear threat for which its nuclear ballistic missile submarines have utility. The last question is linked to a sensitive debate on Britain’s perceived role in the world and whether that role is to be fulfilled with naval power consisting of nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers or not.

Erik Meijer (LL.M) is employed as a policy advisor for the Municipality of Amsterdam. He is currently pursuing an M.A. in International Relations at Webster University, Leiden. This article was written on a personal title and does not in any way reflect the viewpoints of the author's employer.