By Colonel Marco Hekkens - A ‘curtain raiser’ about a multi-disciplinary study into future military/civil engagement in (mega) coastal conglomerations. ¹ This article is a brief introduction into this complex operating environment: speaking in military terms it should be seen as the 'orientation phase' of any operational planning process. It is aimed to spark debate on the role of the future military (in a joint & combined, interagency setting); define future force structure and training and equipments requirements; and crucial ‘enabling mechanisms’. Project FUEL-L is very much 'work in progress’ and the interaction with respondents and insights gained will be most valuable for the research; and building a network of 'co-thinkers'.

Introduction
With increasing recurrence, articles are published that discuss the effects of migration towards the coastal (littoral²) areas in the world, explaining a variety of reasons; and introducing possible future risks and threats, of which some can have regional, if not global security consequences. A common cause for many, if not all of the risks is the quest for resources and base necessities such as food and potable water. Other risks follow the prevailing level of criminal activity, where one could argue that there is at least a linear relation between the size of the population, the level of unemployment and the level of crime. Other authors will passionately discuss the risk to the environment, where functioning civil institutions find it increasingly hard, if not impossible to deal with the increasing influx of people into already poorly regulated and polluted areas, with defunct or no existing sanitation infrastructures. In certain regions this all is even further compounded by failing agricultural schemes due to changes in weather patterns. With more people moving into already congested areas, most of which are ignorant to basic awareness and care for the(ir) environment, it will simply create a downward spiral of living circumstances, especially in the already, endemic poorer areas of the world. It will create a vicious cycle between poverty, urban poverty, and environmental burdens.

“Cities are associated with environmental degradation, squalor, poverty and crime. It is only in recent years that policymakers have begun to understand that well-planned and well-governed cities can prevent the negative consequences of urbanisation, and can actually provide an opportunity to address and mitigate urban poverty and environmental degradation”³

Project FUEL-L will study the interlocking effects caused by an increasing expansion of urban littoral conglomerations, with the aim to distil insights that can contribute to and inform national, NATO and EU⁴ policy making for future military engagement in such specific ‘operating areas’. During this orientation stage, no geographical boundaries are set, although one should not deduce from this that for instance Dutch Forces will always be able to operate ‘world-wide’.⁵ From a military point of view, it will also assess options for methods of deployment and employment of combined/joint maritime, amphibious and other joint forces, and agencies in this complex operating environment by looking at the Decisive Capabilities, Decisive Conditions and Supporting Effects required in this unique environment.

To quote: “Of course, the military can do any kind of task. The boundary between what the military should and should not do is maintained only by tradition, norms and principles: Changes loom large”.⁶ But will they?

On 26 November, Dr Sebastian Reyn, Director of the Future Policy Survey regarding the future of the armed forces of The Netherlands reiterated that ‘the world becomes more uncertain, less secure’⁷. Whilst many will probably concur, based on informed data or just on personal perception, it is far more difficult to draw the correct deductions and set ‘wheels in motion’ that will – for instance – allocate financial resources to prepare the Armed Forces for 2020 and beyond, independent of the political bias of the in-place government.

Maritime Focus – With inland reach and supporting effect
Maritime expeditionary forces, operating in a cooperative, combined and joint context are forces of choice for operations in the littoral and adjacent land environment. Operations and type of missions can span across a broad range of employment options: ranging from military and/or humanitarian assistance to local authorities in a benign environment by invitation, to discreet focused intervention in a specific area bounded by time and space, to more prolonged military operations in a much wider littoral environment including major urbanised conglomerations, industrial infrastructures; and with a diverse tapestry of economic, cultural, ethnic and/or historical influences. The latter two can be by invitation by the local government, or under a mandate from the International Community or a Regional Security Cooperation Initiative (e.g. the UN, EU, AU, OSCE etc).

Maritime expeditionary forces – now and in the future – bring niche capabilities that are uniquely suited to augment and complement in-place military, police, civil emergency services and institutions; and other agency capabilities. To fully anticipate and understand this future urban extreme littoral (land) operating environment will become quintessential to maintain enduring ‘maritime relevance’. Not downgrading traditional maritime roles (which remain important), there should be increased focus on the littoral environment and all military must become intimately ‘at home’ in it, maintaining agility and adaptability and ensure ‘4-dimensional ⁸ manoeuvre dominance’. Simply put, the maritime ‘security umbrella’ does not stop at the edge of the water! By any stretch of imagination, this will not be an easy task; and it will require significant additional training for both joint staffs and forces. It will also require a new Mindset (with capital ‘M’), as recently stated by Lieutenant General Viereck during the 2009 Confined and Shallow water Conference.⁹ This new Mindset must foremost accept that military forces may, or even will play – more than before – a supporting role to local, foreign civilian institutions, and that Key Relation Building¹⁰ with local actors will precede ‘full flow’ military supporting operations in order to establish a viable ‘playing field’ from the outset.

Shaping the Future – Shaping the Expectations
It follows from the previous paragraph that both the political and military leadership at all levels of command must be ‘attuned’ to future engagement in these highly complex and demanding urbanised littoral environments. To understand ‘complexity’, one must look at the detail and the many interlocking factors to make an informed decision, clearly without loosing the overview. However, ignoring the detail at an early stage will increase the risk of setting ourselves up for potential failure and/or increasing operating costs at a future stage.

The ‘Age of Austerity’, the real and combined effects of the current financial crisis, but also climate change; and resource and energy concerns, may very well start to show at some distant time in the future despite sounds of optimism. And, that therefore, while there may be a pressing reason and clear mandate for intervention, some Nations may find it increasingly hard to contribute with appropriate capabilities ‘at readiness’, in the right quantities; at considerable distance from home. In this context, the decision to proceed with building a Joint Support Vessel to support expeditionary operations will positively influence to what extend The Netherlands can continue to contribute to future joint operations ‘from the sea’ at strategic distance. Either as part of a ‘pre-positioned force’, or responding to an emergency. In view of the ongoing migration towards the coast, this is of importance if The Netherlands wishes to be a responsible member of coalitions.

It is for such reasons that one might cautiously predict that future missions by European nations will probably be less ambitious, and conducted at ‘less strategic distance’ (much closer to home), in North Africa, the Middle East and possibly Central Africa. There will possibly be a much greater emphasis on humanitarian disaster and/or conflict prevention, on defensive security and on policing the consequences of any state failures in the European neighbourhood. Far greater emphasis will need to be placed on ‘pre-conflict intervention’ and on the stabilisation of existing institutions.¹¹ While this may sound promising or just ambitious, will the legal framework underpinning legitimacy for military engagement transform at a similar pace; and how will the International Community (IC) look at sovereignty issues when ‘immediate action’ for moral, humanitarian, environmental or other pressing unlawful acts is deemed necessary by that same IC; or a group of (legitimate) Regional Actors?¹²

In confronting today’s and tomorrows challenges, civilian and military forces must increasingly work together in a cooperative fashion, oftentimes bringing to bear the same toolbox and similar procedures. Therefore, at least in theory only slight modifications and understanding will be required to make a truly combined and cooperative force, capable of organising complicated civil-military effect in complex places. Nowadays, an increased requirement for military-civilian cooperation is well understood and widely acted upon by most of NATO forces as operations in Afghanistan demonstrate. But turning to future engagement in the urban littoral, are we ready to accept that military-civilian cooperation and cross-training would not only allow civilian and military become much better acquainted with each other’s current and future capabilities, but that it would also promote seamless and complementary operations, and – in extremis – could replace each other….there where possible(!)?

As one consequence, I envisage future military forces working much closer with Law Enforcement and Public Safety Agencies; and that therefore it must be clear from the outset what the military forces can do, and perhaps more important, what they should not do unless absolutely necessary in order to avoid creating seams along jurisdictional lines between military and Law Enforcement agencies. In this context, it is interesting to note that NATO is yet to formally decide its position on this particular type of cooperation with Law Enforcement agencies.¹³

Conclusion
The comprehensive, multi-facetted approach of Project FUEL-L depends very much on the dynamic and creative interaction with a broad range of experts and enthusiasts through informed debate.
The JASON community, as an ‘intellectual environment of choice’, would be an ideal audience of potential ‘co-thinkers’ to contemplate, discuss and debate, and ultimately inform our political leaders of pertinent viewpoints and deeply rooted beliefs that will affect the foreign policy of The Netherlands, and by association its Armed Forces. Maintaining our traditional maritime relevance is only one facet thereof, albeit very close to my heart.

‘It is true that a person who looks 10 years ahead and says he knows exactly what the future will be – is, frankly, a Court Jester. But by using new and novel thinking we will be able to question current judgment – and through this questioning comes innovation and through innovation real and tangible improvements in European military capabilities can be achieved’.¹⁴ Project FUEL-L has been initiated exactly with this in mind.

* The author currently serves as Deputy Commander Netherlands Maritime Force and Commander Landing Force. From January 2010 he will be on standby as Deputy Force Commander and Senior National Representative for the combined United Kingdom/Netherlands European Battlegroup rotation 2010/1.

Col Hekkens is currently scheduled to talk about Project FUEL-L on 22 February as part of the monthly JASON activity roster. This article is written on a personal title and does not necessarily represent official Defence, Navy or Marine Corps policy or viewpoints.

Notes
¹ Research areas are for instance: orchestrating the military – non-military interface; incl. the legal framework; and local jurisdiction and ‘routine’ delineation of responsibilities; demographic and socio-economic considerations – to include delineation along lines such as: ‘have & have not’; historical, religious and cultural boundaries; public health and pandemic threats; innovative mass transportation developments; mass evacuation & area containment; media operations; robotics and remote sensing; cyber ‘warfare’; radicalisation; management of the safety and security of infrastructures and ‘critical nodes’ (avoid ‘domino effect’); future ‘entertainment’ trends (what is ‘cool’, and where?); bio/chemical, incl. ‘natural’ pollution hazard mitigation; registration and tracking of people; building design (counter ‘vertical mobility’); ‘Gangland culture and warfare’, incl. gang & criminal critical nodes; implications of climate change (on infrastructure and ecosystems).
² Defined as ‘the coastal sea areas and that portion of the land which is susceptible to influence or support from the sea, generally recognised as the region which horizontally encompasses the land-watermass interface from 100 kms ashore to 200 nm at sea, and extending vertically into space from the bottom of the ocean and from the land surface’.
³ “Here's how we can live with a global population of 9bn” by Anna Tibaijuka. Europe’s World, Summer 2009, no. 12.
⁴ With its new policy document unveiled on the 15th October–“Towards the integration of maritime surveillance: A common information sharing environment for the EU maritime domain”– the European Commission is setting in motion a hugely ambitious plan to knit together numerous national and regional maritime players and their incompatible databases (Defence IQ.com Newsletter 26 November 2009).
⁵ Unfortunately, this statement can be read as contrary to the motto of the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps: Qua Patet Orbis – ‘As wide as the world extends’!
⁶ Third Generation Civil-Military Relations and the ‘New Revolution in Military Affairs’ by Frederik Rosén (DIIS Working Paper 2009:03).
⁷ De Volkskrant, ‘Kamer krijgt keus uit vier opties voor leger’; 28 November 2009, page 3.
⁸ Project FUEL-L introduces the term 4th Dimension to describe the future sub-terranean battlespace. Possibly, if not true, the most ‘expensive’ infrastructures are situated below ground level. The sub-terranean battlespace presents unique challenges and risks, with specialist skills required across wide fields of expertise.
⁹ Karlheinz Viereck, LtGen German Airforce - Deputy Chief of Staff Allied Command for Transformation, statement during his delivery of the Keynote Speech at the Centre of Excellence for Operations in Confined and Shallow Waters Conference in Kiel, 10 November 2009.
¹⁰ This expression is a more appropriate term for ‘Key Leader Engagement (KLE)’ as it underscores the purpose of KLE: engagement with other stakeholders, not necessarily agreeing at first, in order to establish mutual trust as prerequisite for further constructive cooperation. Term introduced in Post Deployment Report of COMUKAMPHIBFOR on completion of their operational tour in Basra, Iraq.
¹¹ Pre-conflict intervention does not per se exclude preventative activities. The timely application of ‘Soft Power’ by invitation, in the Host Nation, could be a forceful tool compared to diplomatic, financial and/or economic measures applied ‘at distance’.
¹² It is beyond the scope of this article, but it is very well possible that nations will agree to ‘divide the world’ into areas where these nations accept a primary responsibility to assist or intervene.
¹³ Bob Mansergh, Commodore (UK Navy) – Deputy Director Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence, speaking on Maritime Security Operations Concept and Alliance Maritime Strategy, Kiel, 10 November 2009.
¹⁴ www.europesworld.org; statement by Mr Paul Collins, Head of Capabilities Support Unit of the European Defence Agency (EDA), 20 March 2009.