By Marcel de Haas - In August 2008 Russia fought and won a five-day war against Georgia. This short conflict fits into Moscow’s increasing assertive security policy of recent years. Under President Vladimir Putin, Russia unfolded an anti-Western stance, condemning NATO expansion, unilateral and dominating policies and the deployment of a missile shield. Furthermore, Moscow wants to remove the ‘Cold War vestiges’ of the current European security architecture and has suspended the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.

This forceful posture has been combined with demonstrations of military force. Examples include the threatening of European states involved in the US missile shield program, by resuming strategic nuclear bomber flights; conducting naval exercises in the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean; re-installing the traditional military parade on Red Square; and by starting or resuming military cooperation with countries ‘hostile’ to the West, such as Libya, Syria, Cuba, and Venezuela. Russia’s warfare against Georgia – considering that the foundations for this armed struggle had been visible for a longer time – was part and parcel of Moscow’s assertive security politics. After providing an essentially military analysis of the Georgia conflict, this article continues to elaborate on the consequences of the conflict for Russia’s military thinking.

Related new Russian conceptual thinking in foreign and security policy, as revealed just before and since the Georgian conflict, also needs to be discussed. Furthermore, whether connected to the Georgia conflict or not, since August 2008 Moscow has launched a huge ‘offensive’ in re-armament programs that should bring its armed forces in line with Russia’s self-perceived return as a superpower.

THE RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN CONFLICT (7-12 AUGUST 2008)
After days of shooting incidents between the de-facto South-Ossetian armed groupings and the Georgian armed forces, in the late evening of Thursday, August 7th, Georgian president Saakashvili ordered his troops to return law and order and Tbilisi’s rule in the rebellious province of South Ossetia . Considering the speed with which the armed forces of Georgia and of Russia brought in troops, it was clear that both parties had prepared for an armed clash. The following day, Moscow sent reinforcements from North Ossetia into South Ossetia and responded fire. Also on August 8th, Russia’s air force started attacks on targets in Georgia proper, i.e. outside Abkhazia and South Ossetia. During the weekend, Russia further increased its military force against Georgia. Its Black Sea Fleet disembarked 4,000 troops in Ochamchire, Abkhazia, and started a maritime blockade of Georgian ports. After the troop build-up was considered at a sufficient level, on Monday August 11th, Russian forces invaded from South-Ossetia and Abkhazia into Georgia proper. The Georgian armed forces were no match for the huge Russian potential of troops and arms and were forced to withdraw. On August 12th, Georgia and Russia agreed on an EU-brokered cease-fire, the so-called ‘Six points peace plan’ . However, from 12-22 August, in spite of the armistice, Russian forces continued military operations in Georgia. On August 22nd, Russia withdrew its military forces from Georgia proper without those that remained in so-called buffer zones south of Abkhazia and South-Ossetia. Russia justified the continued occupation of Georgian territory upon point five of the Medvedev-Sarkozy peace plan: ‘Prior to the establishment of international mechanisms the Russian peacekeeping forces will take additional security measures.’ A few days later, on August 26th, Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In a successive round of negotiations between the French President Sarkozy on behalf of the EU, and his Russian counterpart Medvedev, Russia agreed to pull its forces out of the buffer zones by October 10th, which simultaneously would be replaced by more than 200 observers of the EU. However, Russia denied access of the EU-observers to the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Next, Russia decided that it would keep 7,600 troops permanently stationed in South Ossetia and Abkhazia; and will set up military bases accordingly . International talks on the conflict, corresponding with point 6 of the peace plan, commenced in Geneva on 15 October 2008, but so far have not resulted in a settlement of the disputes.

Russia’s military build-up and comparison of forces
Some sources claim that Russia had prepared for war already years ago, but in spring 2008 evidence for such an assumption became stronger . In April, Russia deployed more than 1,000 additional troops to its – formally ‘CIS’ – peacekeeping force in Abkhazia, which until then consisted of some 2,000 soldiers. As of April, Russian military aircraft regularly violated Georgian airspace. The most striking example was a Georgian drone, which provided footage of being attacked by a Russian fighter, just before it was shot down. In May/June, Russia deployed its so-called Railway Troops to repair railway tracks in Abkhazia, which during the conflict were to be used to transport reinforcements from Russia to the battlefield in Georgia . Moreover, on July 10th, the commander of Russia’s North Caucasus Military District (NCMD) stated that his troops were exercising for possible intervention in Abkhazia and/or South Ossetia. At the end of July, the NCMD conducted exercises near Georgia’s border including its 58 Army. This formation would subsequently act as the key player in the armed conflict with Georgia. In late July, ships of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, involved in the same Kavkaz-2008 exercises, did not return to their port and later also contributed in the Georgia conflict . The gradual build-up of Russian armed forces in the months prior to the conflict explains the rapid pace with which Moscow was able not only to counter Georgia’s invasion of South Ossetia, but also to conduct land, air and naval operations simultaneously and all over Georgia.
The question remains whether Saakashvili realized that by invading South Ossetia he would be confronted with Russia’s military power. By any comparison of forces between both combating parties, it was clear that the Georgian armed forces did not have any chance in defeating Russia’s army. Of course, the discrepancy in numbers has to be regarded with due reserve, since Moscow did not conduct warfare with the whole of its armed forces. Nevertheless, the difference in military capabilities is striking. Even if we limit the comparison of forces to those of the NCMD, the adjacent Russian area from which most reinforcements of troops and arms came from, the superiority of Russia’s military power over that of Georgia’s is still evident.

Russia’s strategic objectives and military targets
Russia’s intentions towards Georgia were made quite clear during and after the conflict, their political-strategic goals being the prevention of Georgian authority over the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; removing Saakashvili from office; preventing Georgia and Ukraine from joining NATO; demonstrating to the West that it has no access to Russia’s former Soviet sphere of influence; discouraging the success of alternative pipelines aimed at diminishing Russia’s energy dominance; and showing to the world that Russia is back as a key player in the international arena willing to influence its agenda. Moscow’s political-strategic objectives were translated into the following military-strategic goals. After neutralizing the Georgian armed forces, by installing buffer zones south of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and consequently occupying vital transport lines and locations, Russian forces could easily control the major part of Georgia’s territory in case of a return of violence. Perhaps Russia also anticipated that by partly occupying Georgia, this might entail an internal revolt against Saakashvili. Subsequently, military-strategic goals resulted in military-operational targets. The targeting by Russia’s land, sea and air forces coincided with the order of battle of Georgia’s armed forces.

Russian conduct of warfare
In their operations the Russian troops used massive artillery and aircraft barrages in stead of precision targeting. Furthermore, Russian soldiers were seen sitting on top of their armored personnel carriers because traveling inside – due to insufficient armor - was more dangerous. Close air support for ground forces was hardly witnessed. Moreover, between four and eight Russian aircraft were shot down by Georgian air defence, which was not-destroyed prior to the offensive. It is known that Russian air force pilots, especially those of fighters and bombers, have a lack of flying hours. As a result of this low level of training but also due to a disproportional use of force in stead of precision guide munitions (PGMs), much collateral damage was caused. Next, it was astonishing to see that the Russian military captured all Georgian arms and equipment that they could find to transport them back to Russia, apparently to use it themselves .

The Russian way of warfare in Georgia clearly gave evidence to the fact that the units involved were either not equipped with PGMs and other high-tech weapons or were not capable of using them properly. Furthermore, a lack of combat-ready trained personnel was obvious. The losses of aircraft were caused by insufficient aerial reconnaissance and other intelligence gathering. The coordination of action among the services (army, air force and navy) also failed. Although after the fiascos of the Chechen conflicts conceptual approaches were launched to increase coordination and to conduct joint warfare – in particular by creating joint-style regional military commands to replace the mainly single service military districts – military action in this conflict was still carried out by way of the long-established structure of command and control. Consequently, the
Russian armed forces conducted in Georgia old-fashioned instead of high-tech and non-contact operations, i.e. the modern (Western-style) of warfare. They won the war by using the traditional Russian/Soviet concept of warfare: an overwhelming use of arms and troops .

CONSEQUENCES FOR RUSSIAN MILITARY THINKING AND REFORMS
In the defence whitepaper of 2003, Russia focused on modern high-tech warfare and on asymmetric conflicts, instead of large-scale conventional wars. However, unless the current large-scale structure of the armed forces is changed, the adaptation of the armed forces to modern warfare is likely to be obstructed. Military exercises and the Georgian conflict demonstrate that Russia is capable of handling conventional warfare, but in a traditional way. Until now, there were no indications that the armed forces are trained and equipped for wide-ranging, complex military operations abroad, which these days is the core business of Western military power. So far, the Kremlin refrained from radically changing the structure of the armed forces toward one which is capable of addressing the challenges of modern warfare and current threats. However, Russia’s global ambitions demand the capability of power projection by highly skilled, modern-equipped, expeditionary military forces that can be deployed at short notice anywhere in the world. At the same time, protracted conflicts in the North Caucasus demand armed forces capable of conducting asymmetric warfare against an irregular opponent. As yet, the conditions of Russia’s military and its future reform plans did not live up to these two demands for the armed forces.

In addition and related to the new concepts on security policy –as laid out in the 2008 edition of Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept-, the Kremlin launched radical plans for modernization of the armed forces. The reforms entail cutting the number of officers from the current 30 percent of the total manpower to 15 percent by 2012. Furthermore, a restructuring of the strategic- and operational-level command-and-control structures was announced. The current system of military districts, armies, divisions and regiments will be replaced by a structure of military districts, operational command units, and brigades. Each military district will have an airborne brigade as a quick-reaction operational-level unit. Based on the experience of the Georgian conflict, these units will be used to accomplish operational-level tasks with high precision and in a matter of several hours. In addition to this, and also with reference to the Georgian conflict, a rise in the defence budget for 2009 of some 25%, and large procurement programs – to replace 30% percent of the old weapons within five years and more than 80% by 2020 – were also made public .

CONCLUSIONS
Although a victory for the Kremlin, the Georgian conflict clearly demonstrated shortcomings in the capabilities of the Russian armed forces. The Georgian conflict is part of a consistent assertive stance in Moscow’s foreign and security policy, of which military power is one of the major instruments. Around the military campaign in Georgia, President Medvedev launched new policy concepts, emphasizing Russia’s return to a position of strength. After the conflict the Kremlin concluded that the military should be brought in line with this status. Thus, ambitious reform and procurement plans were announced. For a number of reasons it is doubtful whether these plans will be carried out.
First, for many years the armed forces have been faced with reforms which were not established, either by obstruction of the generals or lack of political will. Secondly, although Russia’s defence budget has risen rapidly since 2001, there is no considerable improvement of combat readiness of the forces. Often, money disappears into the pockets of corrupt officers or is used inefficiently. Defence Minister Serdyukov, a former tax official, was nominated for this post by former President Putin especially to counter corruption and obstruction by the military leadership. Thirdly, Russia is suffering heavily from the international financial crises, to an extent that the financial reserves built up by oil and natural gas revenues are fainting away rapidly. Money might be needed more to avoid social unrest than to invest in military power . However, if the Kremlin maintains its military ambitions and is capable of realizing them, then the West, confronted with a resurgent Russia, might have to change its defence plans into those in which collective defence has once again a central focus.

Lieutenant-Colonel Royal Netherlands Army Dr. M. de Haas is Senior Research Fellow at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. He is also a member of the Advisory Board of JASON.

NOTEN
-There are also claims that the other side started the conflict. Georgia’s invasion was allegedly in reply to South Ossetian attacks on Georgian villages, which triggered the conflict. See: ‘Eyewitness accounts confirm shelling of Georgian villages’, RadioFreeEurope/ RadioLiberty, 14 November 2008; Another source claims that Russian reinforcements were already in South Ossetia on 7 August 2008 (‘Soldaty
govoryat’, polit.ru, 10 September 2008).
-The Medvedev-Sarkozy 6 points armistice plan comprised: (1) No resort to the use of force; (2) The absolute cessation of all hostilities; (3) Free access to humanitarian assistance; (4) The Georgian Army must withdraw to their permanent positions; (5) The Russian Armed Forces must withdraw to the line where they were stationed prior to the beginning of hostilities. Prior to the establishment of international
mechanisms the Russian peacekeeping forces will take additional security measures; (6) An international debate on the future status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and ways to ensure their lasting security (‘Press Statement following Negotiations with French President Nicolas Sarkozy’, 12 August 2008, kremlin.ru, http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/12/2100_type82912type82914typ....
-http://news .bbc .co.uk/2/hi/europe/7606072.stm; http://www.rferl.org/section/South+Ossetia+Crisis/454.html; http://en.rian.ru/trend/osset/index1.html.
-According to Andrei Illarionov, former advisor of President Putin on economic affairs, Russia had been preparing for a war against Georgia since 2004, after Saakashvili aligned himself with the West and had returned Ajaria under his rule (Le Monde, 25 October 2008; Ekho Moskvy, 19 August 2008).
-‘Schöner Schein um Sarkozys Kaukasus-Mission’, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 12 September 2008; ‘Russia doubling its troops in Georgia’s Abkhazia region’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 5 May 2008; ‘Abkhaziya – “Germesova” mogila’, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, 25 April 2008; ’UN mission confirms Georgian, rejects Russian version of air clash’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 27 May 2008; ‘Russia deploys railway troops to Abkhazia’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 3 June 2008.
-‘“The-recognition” of Georgia’s territorial integrity’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 11 July 2008; ‘Russian railroad troops complete mission in Abkhazia’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 31 July 2008; P. Felgengauer, ‘Eto byla ne spontannaya, a splanirovannaya voyna’, Novaya Gazeta, 14 August 2008; ‘Did Russia plan its war in Georgia?’, RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 15 August 2008.
-Georgia war shows Russian army strong but flawed’, Reuters, 20 August 2008; V. Ivanov, ‘Tsena pobedy v Yuzhnoy Osetii’, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, 22 August 2008.
-‘Absence of regional commands blamed for Russian inadequacies in Ossetia’, Moskovsky Komsomolets,
23 August 2008; A.D. Tsyganok, ‘Uroki pyatidnevnoy voyny v Zakavkaze’, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, 29 August 2008.
-Russia to downsize Armed Forces to 1 mln by 2012’, RIA Novosti, 14 October 2008; ‘Russia’s radical military reform in progress’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 20 November 2008; ‘Pushka vmesto masla’, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, 15 September 2008.
-M. de Haas, Veiligheidsbeleid en airpower onder Jeltsin en Poetin: de ontwikkeling van het veiligheidsdenken in de Russische Federatie en de gevolgen ervan voor de inzet van het luchtwapen (1992-2000), Utrecht: uitgeverij De Banier, 2004, pp. 75- 84; ‘Russia to slash bloated military bureaucracy’, Reuters, 14 October 2008; ‘Russia’s peace offensive’, International Herald Tribune, 14 October 2008; ‘Mismanagement of Russia’s economy could lead to social unrest’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 1 December 2008.